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I. Introduction  
 
This paper presents the results from a study that investigates the performance of a tactical 
Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) in en route airspace, under varying 
demand levels, with realistic traffic flows. The ASAS concept studied here allows flight 
crews of equipped aircraft to perform separation from other air traffic autonomously.  
 
This study addresses the tactical aspects of an ASAS using aircraft state data (i.e. position 
and velocity) to detect and resolve projected conflicts. In addition, use of a conflict 
prevention system helps ASAS-equipped aircraft avoid maneuvers that may cause new 
conflicts. ASAS-capable aircraft are equipped with satellite-based navigation and 
Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) for transmission and receipt of 
aircraft state data. 
 
In addition to tactical conflict detection and resolution (CD&R), a complete, integrated 
ASAS is likely to incorporate a strategic CD&R component with a longer look-ahead 
time, using trajectory intent information. A system-wide traffic flow management (TFM) 
component, located at the FAA command center helps aircraft to avoid regions of 
excessive traffic density and complexity. A Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS), as used today is the system of last resort. This integrated approach 
avoids sole reliance on the use of the tactical CD&R studied here, but the tactical 
component remains a critical element of the complete ASAS.  
 
The focus of this paper is to determine to what extent the proposed tactical component of 
ASAS alone can maintain aircraft separation at demand levels up to three times that of 
current traffic. The study also investigates the effect of mixing ASAS-equipped aircraft 
with unequipped aircraft (i.e. current day) that do not have the capability to self-separate. 
Position and velocity data for unequipped aircraft needs to be available to ASAS-
equipped. Most likely, for this future concept, state data would be available from 
instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft, equipped with at least ADS-B transmission 
capability. 
 
The objective is to reduce the number of losses of separation to a minimum and 
investigate the limits of tactical-only CD&R. Thus, the objective is not, expressly, to 
achieve zero losses of separation with tactical ASAS because this is one component of an 
integrated ASAS.  
 
II. Motivation/ Significance 
 
The ASAS concept analyzed here has the potential to allow the flight crew of equipped 
aircraft to assume responsibility for separation during the en route phase of flight. This 
can potentially increase airspace capacity that today is primarily limited by the workload 
constraints of air traffic controllers.  
 
The concept may also increase the flow of traffic through an airport by enabling aircraft 
to meet a required time of arrival (RTA) at the arrival fix. Accurately meeting an RTA 
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evens out traffic flow and reduces spacing uncertainty. The capability to meet an RTA is 
a key element of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) trajectory-
based operations (TBO) concept, as defined in the Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO) concept of operations (CONOPS) [1].  
 
In addition to capacity gains, ASAS may also increase the efficiency of flight by allowing 
more direct routing compared with the routes in use today. Airlines and flight crews gain 
flexibility to modify routes during flight while remaining within National Airspace 
System (NAS) constraints.  
 
The ASAS concept directly addresses transition path issues between today’s IFR 
operations to a future state where IFR traffic safely inter-operates with self-separating 
ASAS operations. 
 
III. Concept Outline 
 
The concept investigated in this study makes use of an automated, flight-deck based 
system for CD&R, combined with a conflict prevention system to prevent aircraft 
maneuvers from creating new conflicts. The KB3D [2] algorithm was used for tactical 
CD&R, combined with a conflict prevention system known as Predictive-ASAS (P-
ASAS) [3]. This combination is referred to as Tactical ASAS in this report.  
 
Upon detection of a potential conflict, a flight-deck display indicates one or more 
possible resolution maneuvers to the pilot. The P-ASAS provides information that the 
pilot can use to avoid additional, secondary conflicts (e.g. within the ensuing 3 minutes). 
Therefore, the pilot makes the final selection of maneuver.  
 
ASAS aircraft are equipped with a Flight Management System (FMS) with the capability 
to meet an RTA. This FMS enables the aircraft to meet flow-management constraints. 
These constraints may include required time and position of airspace-region crossing 
points and required arrival time at an airport arrival fix. 
 
Thus, using ASAS, in properly equipped aircraft, trained crews can assume responsibility 
for traffic separation. Such crews would be free to modify their flight path in real time, 
without approval from an air traffic controller as long as the trajectory meets any flow-
management constraints. 
 
The concept necessitates that self-separating flights operate under a new set of flight rules 
called autonomous flight rules (AFR). The AFR flights are required to maintain 
separation from all other aircraft. Using a set of priority rules, one aircraft in the pair in 
conflict is required to maneuver first, with the other aircraft maneuvering if the situation 
becomes urgent. 
 
In a mixed equipage environment, AFR aircraft are also required to maintain separation 
from aircraft operating under IFR and must give priority to such aircraft. Air traffic 
controllers would issue flow-management constraints to all aircraft and continue to 
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provide separation among IFR aircraft, accommodating those operators who choose not 
to equip for AFR. In all likelihood, controllers would need to be aware of the presence of 
AFR aircraft and avoid maneuvering IFR aircraft into short-term conflicts with AFR. 
However, controller actions in a mixed equipage environment are not within the scope of 
this study. 
 
IV. Technical Approach 
 
The technical approach for this study was to investigate the performance of Tactical 
ASAS using the Traffic Manager (TMX) simulator [4]. TMX was developed by the 
National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands (NLR) and enhanced by NASA 
Langley Research Center.  
 
TMX was developed for use in studies of aircraft based concepts in future ATM 
environments. TMX can be used as one component of a real-time simulation in an air-
traffic laboratory or as a stand-alone desktop simulation. This study used TMX as a 
stand-alone, non real-time simulator without any human in the loop interaction.  
 
Currently, in stand-alone mode, TMX runs on a single workstation and can simulate up to 
2000 airborne aircraft. This limits experiments to the scope of e.g. one ATC center at up 
to three times current demand levels. Figures 1 and 2 are screenshots of the TMX 
graphical user interface. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. TMX user interface showing AFR aircraft (green) and IFR aircraft (blue). 
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Figure 2. TMX conflict prevention bands for heading, speed and vertical rate. 
(Yellow band indicates a predicted conflict within 5 minutes, red within 3 minutes.) 
 
Aircraft within TMX may be equipped with some or all of the following features:  
• auto-flight functionality  
• four-dimensional flight management system (FMS) 
• RTA capability 
• Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
• CD&R 
• P-ASAS  
 
TMX has an aircraft dynamics model that includes the effect of wind and uses aircraft 
performance data from the Base of Aircraft Data (BADA). The Eurocontrol Experimental 
Centre in Brétigny, France developed and currently maintains BADA. TMX has a simple 
pilot model that contains decision-making logic (e.g. choice of conflict resolution 
maneuver) and includes pilot reaction times. 
 
The KB3D CD&R algorithm was implemented within TMX for use in this study. KB3D 
is a tactical, state-based CD&R algorithm developed in the Safety Critical Avionics 
Systems Branch at NASA Langley Research Center [5].   
 
The KB3D algorithm provides one or more horizontal and vertical resolutions by 
calculating analytical solutions using linear trajectory projections. KB3D considers two 
aircraft in conflict, solving the most urgent conflict first. Resolutions are independent, so 
only one aircraft needs to maneuver and resolutions are coordinated so both aircraft can 
maneuver. 
An advantage of an analytic approach is that the underlying math is amenable to formal 
proof of correctness. This allowed the mathematical properties of KB3D to be 
Heading 
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extensively studied and formalized in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [6]. 
Formal proof using PVS guarantees that the algorithm will provide a resolution; however, 
KB3D does not check the resolution maneuvers for physical feasibility.  
 
V. Simulation Setup 
 
The airspace region used for this study is Fort Worth Center (ZFW) (see figure 3). All 
aircraft departing from, flying through or landing within ZFW are included in the 
simulation. Figure 4 shows the notional elevation view of the en route airspace defined 
for this experiment, with altitude bounds from 17,000 ft to 60,000 ft. The CD&R and P-
ASAS systems were functional from departure, through transition into the experiment 
volume and then turned off as aircraft exit from the experiment volume. Flights were 
deleted from the simulation as they descended through 5000 ft. 
 
 
Figure 3. Fort Worth Center airspace. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment airspace. 
VI. Flight Data Sets 
 
The flight trajectories that were recorded by ETMS on 19 February 2004 form the basis 
for the flight data sets used in this study. Thus, simulated traffic flows are realistic, based 
on actual recorded data. The simulated traffic flows retain the complexity of the traffic 
flows within ZFW center. 
 
The flight data sets consisted of IFR-only, AFR-only and mixed scenarios and range from 
one to three times current demand levels. The increased demand levels were created by 
cloning the baseline-recorded trajectories and rescheduling as described below. Table 1 
shows the number of flights in each of the data sets. 
 6
 
 IFR 
baseline 
schedule 
1X AFR 2X AFR 3X AFR 1X IFR 
+ 
1X AFR 
1X IFR 
+ 
2X AFR 
Total flights 4,079 4,079 8,158 12,237 8,158 12,237
Table 1. Flight data sets used in simulation. 
 
The IFR flights use the as-flown trajectories that were derived from the ETMS radar track 
data (TZ) messages. The IFR flight schedule is almost exactly as flown, with slight 
adjustments in departure times; these were made as necessary to ensure a minimum 
spacing of 70 seconds between aircraft arriving at the same arrival fix.  
 
The AFR flights are based on the same ETMS data converted to great-circle routes and 
are scheduled to meet 70 seconds spacing at the arrival fix. AFR flights flew fuel-optimal 
trajectories based on BADA performance data and were not constrained by the current 
cardinality rules for flight altitude levels.  
 
For the mixed flight schedules, AFR flights were inserted into gaps in the IFR arrivals 
streams at each fix to maintain a minimum of 70 seconds spacing. 
 
The use of 70 seconds spacing ensures that the minimum distance between aircraft at the 
airport arrival fixes is approximately 5 nm. For simplicity of scheduling, generic arrival 
fixes replace the actual arrival fixes. Four generic fixes are equally spaced on a 40 nm 
radius circle centered on each airport. This four-corner post arrangement is close to the 
actual fix arrangement used by many airports (an example is DFW).  
 
Scripted conflicts were not included in this experiment. Rather, all aircraft departed their 
origin airports at their nominal time to meet their RTA at the arrival fixes. Conflicts 
developed naturally without pre-determination. The result is that the ASAS system is 
subjected to a full range of traffic situations and geometries that ranged from simple to 
quite complex. The experiment was therefore a blind test of whether the conflict 
management algorithms and procedures were robust to all of the conditions that were 
encountered. 
 
VII. Results and Discussion 
 
The results presented below were obtained from simulations that employed error-free 
surveillance data. The simulation test cases used actual wind data from 19 February 2004, 
without errors between actual and predicted winds. The modeling included aircraft 
dynamic performance, with error-free FMS performance. Pilot response times were 
included, but were not randomized. TMX has the ability to include randomized errors for 
all modeled systems, including wind measurement and prediction errors; the performance 
of ASAS with realistic errors is the subject of on-going and future research.  
 
The results analysis is organized into the following sections: first, traffic densities; next, 
conflicts and losses of separation; finally, flight efficiency. 
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Traffic Densities 
 
Table 2 shows various measures of traffic density in the simulation. By design, the 24-
hour demand was twice and three times the baseline. The number of aircraft airborne at 
any time varies according to the schedule and the peak does not reach exactly twice and 
three times the demand. The peak flight density multiplier is somewhat less than the 2X 
and 3X input demand because flights are re-scheduled to ensure a minimum of 70 
seconds between aircraft at the airport arrival fixes.  
 
 IFR 
baseline 
schedule 
2X AFR 3X AFR 
Flights Multiple 
of baseline
Flights Multiple 
 of baseline
Total flights  
in 24 hrs 
4,079 8,158 2X 12,237 3X
Peak flights in 
simulation 
516 1,035 2X 1,519 2.9X
Peak flights ZFW 126 241 1.9X 326 2.6X
Mean flights ZFW in 
24 hrs 
61 114 1.9X 171 2.8X
Table 2. Number of aircraft in the simulation. 
 
The busiest sector within ZFW was ZFW4201 High sector. This sector had a maximum 
count of 46 aircraft simultaneously in the sector for the 3X demand compared with 17 for 
the baseline number of airborne aircraft. This is well in excess of the current maximum 
capacity of 20 aircraft set by the monitor alert parameter (MAP) value (see figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Number of aircraft in busiest ZFW sector (ZFW4201 High). 
 
A discussion of Tactical ASAS performance follows in the next sections, in terms of 
conflicts and losses of separation and efficiency of flight. Note, however, that traffic 
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densities outside of ZFW center are less than the actual traffic densities because not all 
flights in the NAS could be included in the simulation. For this reason, conflict data was 
analyzed within the experiment volume only. Data outside of the experiment volume 
does not represent the performance of Tactical ASAS at full traffic densities. Likewise, 
efficiency data is interpreted with the caveats stated in the relevant section. 
 
Conflicts and Losses of Separation 
 
The terms used and values of key parameters are presented prior to discussion of results.  
 
Definitions of terms are: 
• Conflict: a predicted loss of separation within a given look-ahead time (One pair 
of aircraft in conflict count as two conflicts). 
• IFR to AFR Conflicts: conflicts detected first by IFR aircraft  
• AFR to IFR Conflicts: conflicts detected first by AFR aircraft  
• LoS: Loss of Separation (One pair of aircraft count as one loss). 
• CPA: Closest Point of Approach between an aircraft and any other. 
 
The criteria used to report a LoS are: 
• Aircraft closer than 5 nm lateral distance and 900 ft altitude, for more than 10 
seconds duration. 
 
The protected zone around an aircraft to detect a conflict is: 
• AFR to AFR:  5.1 nm lateral, 950 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
• AFR to IFR:   6.1 nm lateral, 1,150 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
• IFR to AFR: 5.1 nm lateral, 950 ft altitude at 180 seconds look-ahead time. 
 
The zone around an aircraft for conflict resolution is: 
• AFR to AFR:  5.2 nm lateral, 1100 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time.  
• AFR to IFR:    6.2 nm lateral, 1300 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The conflict resolution zone was larger than the protected zone to allow some 
uncertainty buffer, increasing the probability that the conflict would be resolved 
by the resolution maneuver. 
 
2. A larger protected zone between AFR to IFR aircraft and a longer look-ahead 
time relative to IFR to AFR was used. The intent was that the AFR aircraft would 
detect and resolve the conflict with the IFR aircraft before the ground controller 
was alerted to the impending conflict. 
 
3. The vertical separation minima is 900 ft rather than the current vertical separation 
minima of 1000 ft, since aircraft may be up to 100 ft from assigned altitude due to 
altimeter inaccuracy. 
 
 9
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained from analysis of data logged by TMX within the 
experiment volume described in the experiment set up section. 
 
ETMS 
based 
1X IFR 
(from 
ETMS) 
1X AFR 2X AFR 3X AFR 1X IFR + 
1X AFR 
1X IFR + 
2X AFR 
Flights 4,079 4,079 8,158 12,237 8,158 12,237
Conflicts NA/ 1,021 4,155 9,257 4,751 12,228
IFR_AFR 
conflicts 
NA/ N/A N/A N/A 628 1,144
Number of 
LoS 
N/A 0 3 25 26  
(2 AFR/ AFR) 
58
(25 AFR/ AFR) 
Resolved 
Conflicts 
(%) 
N/A 100.0% 99.9% 99.5% 98.9% 99.1%
Table 3. Conflicts and losses of separation within experiment volume. 
 
The results show that Tactical ASAS, using the KB3D CD&R algorithm, in combination 
with P-ASAS can prevent all losses of separation for the 1X demand scenario if all 
aircraft are AFR flights. For the 2X AFR scenario, one of the three LoS is attributable to 
Tactical ASAS. The LoS was of short duration with a separation of 4.5 nm at the CPA. 
The other two LoS are caused by an experiment set up issue that is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
The number of LoS increases for the 3X AFR scenario. However, all but four of the LoS 
had a CPA larger than 3 nm. The closest encounter had a CPA of 0.18 nm, but in this 
case, the vertical separation was 818 ft, which is just under the 900 ft vertical separation 
criteria used for this study. 
 
The mixed 1X IFR + 1X AFR case has many IFR to AFR conflicts. Note that this would 
require the IFR aircraft to take action to avoid the AFR aircraft, which is contrary to the 
concept design. In addition, considerably more losses of separation occurred compared 
with the all-AFR scenario with the same 2X demand.   
 
The mixed 1X IFR + 2X AFR case has one-third more conflicts and more than twice as 
many losses of separation than the all-AFR case at the same 3X demand level. 
 
The causes for many of the LoS are understood; discussion of causes and some 
suggestions for improving the performance of Tactical ASAS follows.  
 
Discussion of Causes of Loss of Separation 
 
The list below identifies the causes of the LoS for the 2X AFR, 3X AFR and the 1X AFR 
+ 1X IFR scenarios and the number of cases that are attributed to each cause. (The 1X 
AFR + 2X AFR scenario has not been analyzed in detail.) Note that a LoS may have 
more than one cause.  
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1. AFR aircraft maneuvers into short-term conflict (24 LoS) 
 
The conflict prevention system should prevent maneuvers that result in conflicts 
with predicted LoS in less than 3 minutes. This was not always the case, 
particularly with climbing and descending aircraft. P-ASAS assumes linear 
trajectory propagation and linear climb and descent profiles. Actual aircraft may 
be changing speed or heading and often do not climb or descend linearly. Aircraft 
in the simulation above 18,000 ft are climbing or descending at constant Mach. 
Since groundspeed reduces with altitude at constant Mach (in the troposphere), 
this results in a flight path that curves in the vertical Cartesian plane. In addition, 
an aircraft climbs more slowly near its maximum altitude limit. For these reasons, 
P-ASAS may incorrectly predict aircraft trajectory, leading to incorrect conflict 
bands. 
 
Aircraft sometimes maneuver into short-term conflict for a different reason; the 
pilot model occasionally selects resolution maneuvers that contradict the P-ASAS 
conflict prevention system. In some circumstances, this problem is unavoidable, 
because conflict bands may indicate that all resolution maneuvers provided by 
KB3D result in a secondary conflict.  
 
2. CD&R and P-ASAS inactivate (16 Los) 
 
The experiment was purposely set up to turn off CD&R and P-ASAS below 
17,000 ft, because the concept studied is for en route airspace. Once turned off, 
CD&R and P-ASAS are not turned on again. Thus, an unintended side effect 
results where one aircraft descends below the boundary and then levels off into a 
short-term conflict. An aircraft can likewise descend below the boundary during 
the climb phase of flight because of a conflict maneuver and then resume 
climbing above 17,000 ft and cause short-term conflicts throughout the remainder 
of the flight. 
  
3. Poor resolution choice (14 LoS) 
 
The pilot model is not sophisticated and can occasionally select a maneuver that is 
a poor choice or that takes the aircraft into an irretrievably complex situation. 
KB3D offers a choice of resolution maneuvers for the two aircraft in conflict, 
independent of the trajectories of other aircraft; the human pilot, supported by P-
ASAS selects the most appropriate resolution.  
 
4. KB3D fails to predict a conflict in time to prevent LoS (11 LoS) 
 
KB3D sometimes detects a conflict with fewer than 3 minutes to LoS. In a few 
cases, only seconds remained before LoS, which is too short a time to resolve the 
conflict. This problem occurs mainly with climbing and descending aircraft. The 
KB3D algorithm assumes linear trajectory propagation and linear climb and 
descent profiles. For the same reasons as explained for cause 1, this can lead to 
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inaccurate prediction of the aircraft trajectory. Consequently, prediction error can 
cause KB3D to detect conflicts too late to prevent a LoS. 
 
5. KB3D does not continue to provide resolutions once aircraft are in LoS (6 
LoS) 
 
The current design of KB3D prevents does not calculate resolutions if the aircraft 
in conflict move into LoS. This problem can prolong the LoS, lead to a closer 
encounter and potentially lead to a further LoS with additional aircraft. For AFR 
to IFR cases where a 6 nm protected zone is used, KB3D stops providing 
resolutions once the aircraft are closer than the 6 nm protected zone even though 
the separation criteria for LoS has not been violated. This is because KB3D does 
not currently distinguish between an additional buffer zone and the actual 
separation criteria.  
 
6. IFR aircraft maneuvers into short-term conflict with AFR (6 LoS) 
 
The simulated IFR aircraft currently fly ETMS recorded trajectories. No 
mechanism is included in the simulation to prevent IFR aircraft from creating 
short-term conflicts.  
 
7. KB3D does not take into account aircraft performance (3 LoS) 
 
While geometrically correct, KB3D may provide a resolution maneuver that is 
beyond the capabilities of the aircraft. The aircraft may not be able to respond 
quickly enough, or the speed or the requested altitude may not be feasible. The 
resolution maneuver may sometimes require an aircraft to climb when it is near 
the aircraft altitude ceiling 
 
The most common cause of LoS was a failure to prevent an AFR heading or altitude 
change from causing a short-term conflict. This cause may be due to a failure of the P-
ASAS system to predict conflict bands or a failure of the pilot model to consider the 
bands.   
 
Improvements to P-ASAS may be possible. Currently, TMX uses a geometric calculation 
for predicting conflict bands, similar but not the same as the KB3D algorithm uses for 
conflict resolution. The KB3D calculations can be formulated to determine conflict 
bands. This would be preferable for consistency with the resolution maneuvers. Using 
realistic assumptions for climb and descent profiles can improve trajectory prediction. 
Using buffer zones that are larger for aircraft not in level flight can better account for 
uncertainty. 
 
Improvements to the pilot model may prevent some of the LoS where the model selects a 
maneuver that fails to consider the conflict bands. An indication of the maneuver with the 
longest time to LoS could assist the human pilot in making a decision and facilitate a 
better simulation model. 
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The second most common cause is a problem with simulation set up; Tactical ASAS is 
turned off below 17,000 ft. The experiment set up problem will be fixed for future 
studies. 
 
The third most common cause is a poor choice of resolution, which can be attributed to 
an unsophisticated pilot model. Given a choice of maneuver from KB3D, a human pilot 
may have avoided the LoS by selecting a better choice of resolution maneuver. Some 
measure of traffic complexity in the region of the proposed maneuver might facilitate a 
better choice of maneuver. This would enable the pilot model in a simulation to make a 
better choice and might be a useful aid to a human pilot who is using ASAS. 
 
Solutions to the remaining causes of LoS are also under consideration. These include 
enhancements to KB3D to improve trajectory prediction and to continue providing 
resolutions for aircraft in LoS. Checking of resolutions for physical feasibility is an 
obvious enhancement e.g. for aircraft near their altitude ceiling a climb is not a good 
choice of resolution. In this case, a heading change or descent would be the better choice. 
 
A version of KB3D that uses some knowledge of aircraft intent is being designed. 
Conflicts may reduce if a strategic component to ASAS is included; this should lead to a 
corresponding reduction in LoS.  
 
Strategic ASAS cannot prevent all short-term conflicts that arise from unplanned 
maneuvers (e.g. for conflict resolution maneuvers, intent data may not be available). 
Therefore, in a mixed equipage environment controllers may be required to avoid 
vectoring IFR aircraft into short-term conflicts with AFR aircraft.  
Efficiency 
 
NAS wide simulation with full traffic densities over all regions of airspace is the best 
means to obtain reliable efficiency metrics. This is not possible using TMX, because 
TMX currently has a limit of 2000 airborne flights. At three times current demand levels, 
around 15,000 to 20,000 flights may be airborne in the NAS at the peak time.  
 
Interpretation of results relating to efficiency is subject to the following caveats: 
 
1. The AFR results overstate the efficiency of flight because full traffic density is 
not achieved outside of the experiment volume.  
 
2. The IFR results are from simulation of actual recorded trajectories that include all 
conflict resolution maneuvers. These trajectories are from the real NAS, so all 
IFR aircraft experienced the full traffic density throughout the flight. AFR flights 
experienced full traffic density in the experiment area only. It is therefore not 
valid to compare IFR and AFR flight efficiencies.  
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3. IFR flights may purposely deviate from great-circle routes to follow a more wind 
optimal route or to avoid restricted airspace, weather or turbulence. Therefore, 
attributing the entire IFR distance penalty to restricted air-routes and controller 
resolution advisories is not valid. 
 
4. The scope of this study was en route, so Tactical ASAS is active from departure 
fix until the aircraft leaves the experiment volume. Consequently, the efficiency 
metrics do not include the arrival or departure flight segments. 
 
However, given the caveats, the simulation results show some interesting trends, as 
analyzed in the following sections. 
Distance, Time and Fuel 
 
Table 4 presents the mean increase in average flight distance, time of flight and fuel used 
for the IFR and AFR-only scenarios. (The efficiency of the mixed equipage scenarios was 
not analyzed). 
 
The basis for comparison is the same aircraft flying an unimpeded great circle route, 
using a fuel-efficient trajectory computed by TMX. The IFR and AFR flights are not 
compared directly for reasons explained above. The data are for the flight trajectory from 
departure fix to the arrival fix. 
 
 Distance (nm) Time (seconds) Fuel (lbs) 
IFR 17.0 (2.5%) -110.7 (-1.9%) 500.0 (5.8%) 
1X AFR 2.5 (0.4%) 11.5 (0.2%) 200.0 (2.4%) 
2X AFR 6.9 (1.0%) 45.3 (0.7%) 300.0 (4.0%) 
3X AFR 12.1 (1.8%) 86.7 (1.4%) 500.0 (5.4%) 
Table 4. Mean increase in flight distance, time and fuel used. 
(Compared to unimpeded great-circle routes.) 
 
The IFR flight distance was somewhat more than the great circle distance, with a 
significant excess fuel burn. However, the IFR flights actually had a mean flight time that 
was less than the unimpeded great circle flights. Therefore, IFR flights are flying 
somewhat faster than the TMX computed fuel-efficient speed. In addition, the excess 
fuel-burn might be partially due to IFR aircraft flying at altitudes that are not fuel-optimal 
because of TFM constraints.  
 
The 1X AFR mean excess flight distance and excess fuel burn was small compared to the 
unimpeded flights. For AFR flights, this excess is the penalty that arises from conflict 
resolution maneuvers. The penalty increases as the demand level increases as expected.  
RTA Capability 
 
Table 5 shows the ability of aircraft to meet an RTA at the arrival fix. Aircraft used the 
closed-loop algorithm modeled in TMX to adjust aircraft speed within their flight 
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envelope, to meet the RTA. This allows the aircraft to compensate for trajectory 
deviations caused by e.g. conflict resolution maneuvers.  
 
 % Flights +-  
5 Sec. of RTA 
% Flights +- 
10 Sec. of RTA 
1X AFR 94.7 95.2 
2X AFR 83.8 85.3 
3X AFR 74.2 76.1 
Table 5. Percentage of flights meeting RTA. 
 
Almost 95% of aircraft meet the RTA within 5 seconds for the 1X scenario. However, the 
RTA meeting capability degrades as demand increases.  
 
Figure 6 shows the probability distribution of the difference between RTA and actual 
time of arrival. 
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Figure 6. Difference in actual and required time at arrival fix. 
 
Although most flights manage to meet the RTA within +- 6 seconds there are a number of 
outliers, particularly for the 3X demand. One cause is the increased number of conflicts 
as traffic densities increase. However, it may be possible to improve the RTA algorithm.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
The conclusions stated here, are valid for the experiment conditions defined, using the 
KB3D tactical CD&R algorithm combined with the TMX P-ASAS conflict prevention 
system. This study did not include system errors and did not include full traffic density 
outside of the Fort Worth center airspace. Some problems with the experiment set up led 
to some LoS not attributable to ASAS. Enhancements to the simulation set up, KB3D and 
P-ASAS should further improve performance.  
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The conclusions from this investigation are: 
 
• The KB3D CD&R algorithm, using aircraft state data only, combined with the 
P-ASAS conflict prevention system, effectively prevented nearly all losses of 
separation up to twice-current demand levels for the AFR-only scenario. For the 
1X AFR scenario, all conflicts were resolved without any losses of separation. 
For the 2X AFR scenario, 99.9% of conflicts were resolved with three losses of 
separation, only one of which was attributed to Tactical ASAS. 
 
• At three times the current demand level and for mixed AFR and IFR scenarios, 
the number of losses of separation increases. Even so, 99.5% of conflicts are 
resolved for the 3X AFR case, 98.9% for the 1X IFR + 1X AFR case and 99.1% 
for the 1X IFR + 2X AFR case. 
 
• For mixed AFR and IFR scenarios, some losses of separation resulted from IFR 
aircraft maneuvers that caused short-term conflicts with AFR. One solution 
could be to alert the controller to conflict-producing maneuvers by trial planning 
before requesting an IFR aircraft to maneuver. In addition, providing AFR 
aircraft with knowledge of the short-term intent of IFR aircraft may reduce the 
occurrence of controller IFR-to-AFR conflict alerts.  
 
• The conflict resolution maneuvers provided by the KB3D CD&R algorithm are 
efficient; for the 1X AFR scenario, the maneuvers result in less than 0.5% mean 
increase in flight distance compared with the unimpeded great circle-route. At 
three times the current demand level the mean increase in distance is still only 
1.8% compared to the great-circle route.  
 
• AFR aircraft can meet their RTA at the arrival fix; 90% are within 5 seconds of 
the RTA, for the 1X AFR scenario. This degrades to 74% within 5 seconds for 
the 3X AFR scenario. 
 
The reasons for many of the observed LoS are understood; others are still under 
investigation. An on-going research effort includes implementing improvements to the 
KB3D algorithm and changes to the TMX simulation code to improve performance of the 
Tactical ASAS component.  
 
With these improvements, the number of losses of separation is expected to be further 
reduced. As one component of a complete ASAS, tactical CD&R is part of a layered 
approach to separation assurance, and is not expected to prevent all losses of separation 
when used alone.  
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